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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE TAXATION OF
RECEIPTS FROM ADVERTISING ENGAGED
IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The conflict of authority between the federal government and
the states with regard to taxation of interstate commerce has been
a source of contention since the founding of the Republic.' One re-
cent example of this conflict exists in the attempts of several states
to tax interstate commercial advertising. 2 Admittedly, the regu-
lation of all interstate commerce is reserved to the Congress by the
commerce clause of the Constitution,3 however, the extent to which
the states may tax and thus regulate advertising with interstate
aspects is as yet unresolved by the courts.
4
1. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) where Mr. Justice
Frankfurter remarked at 251:
The power of the States to tax and the limitations upon that power
imposed by the Commerce Clause have necessitated a long, con-
tinuous process of Judicial adjustment. The need for such adjust-
ment is inherent in a federal government like ours, where the
same transaction has aspects that may concern the interests and
involve the authority of both the central government and the
constituent States.
2. See, e.g., Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250
(1938); Fischer's Blend Stations, Inc. v. Washington State Tax Comm'n,
297 U.S. 650 (1936); Lee Enterprises, Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'r, 162
N.W.2d 743 (Iowa 1968); Albuquerque Broadcasting Co. v. Bureau of Reve-
nue, 51 N.M. 332, 184 P.2d 416 (1947); New Yorker Magazine v. Gerosa,
3 N.Y.2d 363, 144 N.E.2d 367 (1957).
3. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
4. See generally 51 A.M. Jur. § 203 (1944). See also Lee Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'r, 162 N.W.2d 743 (Iowa 1968).
Actually the problem is twofold: (1) Whether the advertising is, in
fact, engaged in interstate commerce; and (2) Whether an attempt by a
state to tax receipts therefrom violates the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. This Comment is primarily concerned with the latter
proposition. Thus, all taxes will be examined with the assumption that
the commerce taxed is interstate commerce, unless otherwise noted.
For cases enumerating what advertising is engaged in interstate com-
merce, see Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950), which
held that the purchase of advertising in a publication published in another
state and with national circulation is "interstate commerce"; Fred Benioff
Co. v. Benioff, 55 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Cal. 1944), where a retail store owner
was considered engaged in "interstate commerce" because of advertisements
over the radio or in the newspaper. Compare Western Livestock v. Bureau
of Revenue, 41 N.M. 141, 65 P.2d 863 (1937), in which advertising contracts
between resident owners of magazines with interstate circulation and cus-
tomers and advertising agencies in other states involving interchange of
There are two conflicting lines of authority which have de-
veloped with regard to state taxation of interstate advertising.5
This Comment will encapsulate the historical development of the
law in this area and the underlying bases for the dichotomy. In
addition, the proposed amendment to the Pennsylvania Tax Reform
Code of 1971 that provides for the extension of the Pennsylvania
Sales and Use Tax to the service of advertising will be examined
as a model to suggest some modifications to and clarifications of
present law.6
II. HISTORICAL ExcuRsus
From an historical view, the conflict caused by state taxation
of advertising engaged in interstate commerce reflects the larger
constitutional conflict which has long existed between the states'
attempts to secure revenue and the national goal of an unfettered
interstate commerce.
A. Genesis of the Commerce Clause
Economic forces played a major role in convening the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1789 in Philadelphia. The Articles of Con-
federation had not relieved the commercial antipathy which ex-
isted between contiguous states, such as New York and Connecti-
cut, in which the latter's commerce suffered a tax in passing
through the former's territorial waters.7 Nor had these Articles
provided a national government with which foreign nations could
deal commercially.
8
Consequently, in 1788, a meeting of national leaders was held
in Annapolis, Maryland, "to take into consideration the trade of
the United States."9 Unable to make substantial progress, a state-
ment was drafted by Alexander Hamilton which affirmed the
magnitude of the trade difficulties and recommended that a broader
convention be convened to deal with all grievances of which com-
merce was inextricably a part.10
Following the Constitutional Convention, certain articles ap-
peared in various newspapers under the mantle of "Publius."
These articles detailed the advantages of union and urged ratifica-
tion of the newly drafted Constitution. A significant theme in
correspondence, mats, copy, and information held not "interstate com-
merce."
5. See text accompanying notes 59-75 infra.
6. H.B. 1335 sess. 1971 § 201 (Printer's No. 1537).
7. E. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERsus STATES RIGHTS 23
(1936).
8. Id.
9. S. MORISON, H. COMMAGER, W. LEIuCHTENBEEG, THE GROWTH OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 244 (1969).
10. THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 1782-1786, 687 (1962).
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these Articles known as the Federalist Papers, was the need for
commercial freedom, both international and interstate:
An unrestrained intercourse between the states themselves
will advance the trade of each by an interchange of re-
spective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal
wants at home, but for exportation to foreign markets.
The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished
and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free
circulation of the commodities of every part."
The method which the drafters of the Constitution chose to
foster commercial freedom, and of which the Federalists urged
adoption, was to reserve the power to regulate interstate com-
merce to the newly created Congress under what has come to be
called the commerce clause.1 2
The commerce clause has been a source of consternation and
judicial controversy for over a century and a half.13 Initially, the
most significant problem was the interpretation of "power": that
is, whether "power" meant the exclusive congressional control of
interstate commerce or parallel control by Congress and the
states. 14 Eighty years after ratification of the Constitution, Chief
Justice Taney wrote that the terms of the Constitution did not
foreclose the conclusion that the mere grant of the commerce power
to Congress excluded the states from such legislation.1 5 Neverthe-
less, when this problem first came before the United States Su-
preme Court in the 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden 16 a different judi-
cial philosophy prevailed. The State of New York had granted a
twenty-year monopoly of steam navigation rights on the Hudson
River to Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston. From these part-
ners, exclusive right to steam navigation between New York and
New Jersey was acquired by Aaron Ogden, who sought to restrain
Thomas Gibbons, owner of a rival steamboat company, from en-
gaging in similar navigation. Gibbons answered Ogden's complaint
by stating that his boats were enrolled under a federal licensing act
which gave him the right to navigate the water between Elizabeth-
town, New Jersey and New York City. Ogden's position was up-
held by Chancellor James Kent of New York; but on subsequent
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 89 (Heirloom Ed. 1968) (A. Hamilton).
12. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, el. 3. "The Congress shall have the power
to regulate Commerce ... among the several States .... "
13. See Lee Enterprises, Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 162 N.W.2d
744 (Iowa 1968).
14. IV LETTERS A D OTHER WRTNCS OF JAMEs MADisox 14-15 (1867).
15. F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAusE 21 (1937).
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
appeal to the United States Supreme Court the decision was re-
versed in favor of Gibbons.1
7
In writing the majority opinion, Chief Justice Marshall ap-
proached the problem on two fronts. The first was the fairly ob-
vious conflict between the federal act and state law with respect
to interstate commerce.' The second was whether the power to
regulate commerce "excludes, necessarily, the action of all others
that would perform the same operation on the same thing," that is,
whether congressional power over interstate commerce completely
excluded any state interference. 19 While Marshall's conclusion in
Gibbons was based primarily upon the first issue in finding that
state law must yield in this instance to federal law, his failure to
affirm the concept of exclusive congressional control of interstate
commerce is considered more significant.20 To one observer, this
failure had subjected state authority to "such limitations as the
Court finds it necessary to apply for the protection of the Na-
tional community."'1  In effect, the Gibbons decision made the
Court the arbiter between state and federal control of interstate
commerce:
The history of the commerce clause, from the pioneer ef-
forts of Marshall to our own day, is the history of imposing
artificial patterns upon the play of economic life whereby
an accommodation is achieved between the interacting con-
cerns of state and nation.
22
Thus, in the absence of legislation, it was left to the court to deter-
mine how far a state could proceed to tamper with the facilities of
interstate commerce before it had impinged upon the powers of
Congress.
B. Post-Gibbons Decisional Patterns
In the area of commerce the typical "accommodation" between
state and nation arises from an attempt by the states to tax certain
revenues which bear some relation to interstate commerce. In de-
termining whether such a tax is constitutional, the United States
Supreme Court has applied two broad approaches based on the
due process clause and the commerce clause.
The due process approach requires "some definite link, some
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or





20. F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMRCE CLAUSE 8-21 (1937).
21. Id. at 18-19.
22. Id. at 21.




the United States Supreme Court applied this approach to strike
down a requirement by the State of Maryland that provided for
collection by out-of-state vendors of Maryland's use tax on all
items sold to Maryland residents. Miller Brothers, a Delaware
merchandising corporation, refused to comply. In retaliation, the
State of Maryland seized one of Miller Brothers' trucks which was
making a delivery within the state, "and the state's highest court
... held it liable for the use tax on all goods sold in the Delaware
state to Maryland residents .... ,,2r The Supreme Court of the
United States reversed the decision and held that in the absence of
some "jurisdictional basis," the burden of collecting the tax could
not be shifted to a foreign merchant.26 Thus, a merchant cannot
be required to collect a use tax for a foreign state because the con-
nection between them (i.e. the sale) is insufficient to give the fore-
ign state jurisdiction to enforce the collection. Thus the due proc-
ess approach makes the determination of whether tax with multi-
state contacts is constitutional in the burden it places on the tax-
payer. On the other hand, the commerce clause approach examines
the tax in terms of its burden on interstate commerce. 27 As early
as 1887, the United States Supreme Court held that a tax upon the
business of sending and receiving interstate telegraph messages
could not be imposed because of its burden on that commerce.
2 8
The opinion stated:
No state has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce
in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the trans-
portation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the re-
ceipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupa-
tion or business of carrying it on, and the reason is that
such taxation is a burden on that commerce.
29
One criticism of this dual approach has been that the Court
has applied the two theories disjunctively, 30 rendering the survi-
val of a tax dependent upon the choice of approach. For example,
there may exist a sufficient nexus between the transaction and the
taxing state to sustain the tax from due process objections, yet it
may fail because of its burdening effect upon commerce. 31 Failure
25. Id. at 341.
26. Id. at 347.
27. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
28. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1887).
29. Id. at 648.
30. See Mr. Jutsice Rutledge's opinion in Harvester Co. v. Department
of Treasury, 322 U.S. 349-362 (1944) where he demonstrates this inconsis-
tency by examining the Court's contradictory determination of several simi-
lar cases.
31. Id. at 353.
to apply the approaches conjunctively may cause irreconcilable
conclusions.
3 2
In refining these approaches the Court has developed two con-
comitant tests which, on the facts presented in individual cases,
lack the metaphysical distinctions between the commerce clause ap-
proach and the 'due process approach. They are referred to as the
direct burden test and the multiple burden test.
The direct burden test holds that if a tax directly affects in-
terstate commerce it is void.33 In Freeman v. Hewit,3 4 the United
States Supreme Court applied the direct burden test to an Indiana
gross receipts tax. There a trustee domiciled in Indiana instructed
his broker to arrange for the sale of certain securities. The securi-
ties were sold on the New York Stock Exchange whereupon the
sale price less commission was sent to Indiana and delivered to the
trustee. Indiana imposed a one per cent sales tax on the gross re-
ceipts from the sale. The Court found the tax to be unconstitu-
tional, stating that although there were several constitutional meth-
ods of taxing the proceeds from interstate commerce indirectly, a
direct tax on the gross receipts from an interstate sale was defi-
nitely "beyond the state taxing power.
35
The multiple burden test holds that the primary reason for in-
terstate commercial immunity from state taxation is the fear that
more than one state might tax the same commerce and subject in-
terstate commerce to "cumulative burdens not imposed on local
commerce." 36 For example, a state may not tax the total gross re-
ceipts of a railroad which passes through the taxing state as well as
other states.37 Otherwise, each state could tax the company's gross
receipts even though each was only responsible for a portion of the
company's revenue in either passengers or freight. In Standard Oil
Co. v. Peck38 the United States Supreme Court invalidated an Ohio
personal property tax applied to an Ohio corporation which oper-
ated boats and barges along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. The
vessels were registered in Ohio but they stopped in Ohio only occa-
sionally for fuel and repairs. Some were almost continuously out-
side Ohio during the taxable year. The Court held that because of
the multi-state contact the vessels could be subject to taxation by
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Fischer's Blend
Stations, Inc. v. Washington State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936);
Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 294 U.S. 384
(1935); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
34. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
35. Id. at 256.
36. Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
37. See, e.g., Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18
(1891).
38. 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
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other states; therefore, a tax by Ohio on the full value of the ves-
sels violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.39
In the nineteenth century, the states devised ingenious meth-
ods to circumvent the direct and multiple burden tests. Thus, if
the taxes were "either in form not directly applicable to interstate
commerce, or if they were properly apportioned so as to prevent
cumulative multiple taxation," 40 they were upheld.
An example of an indirect tax on interstate commerce which
has long been valid is a real property tax.41 The tax is constitu-
tional even though the property is owned and used by a firm en-
gaged exclusively in interstate commerce. 42 Thus, while a state
may not directly tax interstate commerce, this prohibition "does
not in the least degree abridge the right of a state to tax at their
full value all the instrumentalities used for such commerce."
43
Furthermore, firms operating both interstate and intrastate ac-
tivities within a state may be subjected to taxes on their interstate
activities. License 44 and privilege,45 taxes have been sustained by
the United States Supreme Court when they are incidental to the
interstate activities. The reasoning is that a company which has
contacts within a taxing state and benefits from the taxing state,
should not escape tax liability because it also engages in interstate
commerce. 48 Likewise, a state may tax interstate commerce if the
tax is apportioned in such a way as to exclude the possibility of
multiple taxation.47 Thus, state gross receipts tax on interstate
railroad companies have been sustained where the tax apportioned
with respect to the amount of track mileage in the taxing state as
compared with the company's total track mileage. 48 Finally, the
Supreme Court has sustained taxes on interstate commerce where
39. Id. at 384.
40. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Government of the Virgin
Islands, 315 F. Supp. 746, 750 (D. St. Thomas & St. John, Virgin Islands
1970).
41. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959);
Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15 (1933); Pullman Co. v.
Richardson, 261 U.S. 330 (1923).
42. See Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U.S. 330 (1923).
43. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 185 (1897).
44. Ficklen v. Taxing District, 145 U.S. 1 (1892).
45. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
46. See Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254
(1938).
47. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); Wisconsin &
Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
48. Pullman's Palace Car v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
the kind of tax levied was incapable of duplication by any other
state, thus eliminating the possibility of a multiple tax burden.
49
In the 1964 United States Supreme Court case, General Motors
Corp. v. Washington,50 the apportionment requirements were re-
laxed "possibly to the point of abandonment." 51 There a Washing-
ton State statute levied a tax upon the privilege of engaging in
business activities within the state. The tax was measured by the
gross sales of motor vehicles, parts, and accessories delivered in
the state. It fell on all receipts and was not apportioned. The
Court found that the total activities of General Motors within the
state of Washington were sufficient to support the tax even though
certain other activities were being carried on outside of Washing-
ton. The Court stated that the validity of the tax "rests upon
whether the state is exacting a constitutionally fair demand for
that aspect of interstate commerce to which it bears special rela-
tion."'52 Apparently, Washington's "fair demand" included total re-
ceipts. Thus, regardless of the apportionment language in the case
(i.e. "fair demand" and "special relation") the entire receipts from
interstate commerce were made the subject matter of the tax. It
should be noted, however, that the Court never passed upon Gen-
eral Motor's claim of "multiple taxation," because General Motors
failed to demonstrate that the taxation formula in question placed
a multiple burden upon it. Fearing that this abandonment of the
apportionment requirements would lead to the risk of multiple tax
burden, four Justices dissented. Justice Brennan spoke for the dis-
senters:
If commercial activity in more than one state results in a
sale in one of them, that state may not claim as all its own
the gross receipts to which the activity within its borders
has contributed only a part. Such a tax must be appor-
tioned to reflect the business activity within the taxing
state.5
The criticism which was raised against the disjunctive applica-
tion of the commerce clause approach and the due process approach
is equally relevant to the application of the direct burden test and
the multiple burden tests. For example, there may be instances in
which a particular tax cannot be imposed by any other state, thus
sustaining the tax against attack under the multiple burden ap-
proach. Yet the tax may be a direct burden on interstate com-
merce, therefore void. The possibility of irreconcilable decisions
where only one of the tests is applied is also apparent. It is sug-
49. E.g. Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
50. 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
51. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Government of the Virgin
Islands, 315 F. Supp. 746, 751 (D. St. Thomas & St. Johns, Virgin Islands
1970).
52. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440 (1964).
53. Id. at 451 (dissenting opinion).
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gested that the reason for the vacillation in the use of these tests
is that the more modem multiple burden test is slowly replacing
the direct burden test.
Regardless of the reason for this lack of' consistency, there have
been numerous outcries from the court for a synthesis;14 and per-
haps no area within this controversy has seen the use of more tests
resulting in more contradictions than in state taxation of commer-
cial advertising.
III. TAXATION OF ADVERTISING
The rising cost of state government creates an increasing de-
mand for more revenue. To satisfy this need, taxation, the main
source of state revenue, must seek out new taxpayers or increase
the burden on the present ones. It is estimated that the American
public is bombarded with $10,535,500,000.00 of advertising yearly.
55
It is not surprising that advertising has become a desirable object
for state taxation. However, advertising like other activities in in-
terstate commerce, is protected to some extent by the commerce
clause.58 It was predictable, therefore, that in seeking to tax this
source of revenue some states would become too covetous and vio-
late this constitutional protection. The first example of this con-
flict came in the 1936 case of Fischer's Blend Station v. Tax Com-
missioner.
57
A. The Early View
In Fischer's Blend, a Washington radio station challenged the
state's occupation tax which was levied on the company's gross re-
ceipts from broadcasting. The United States Supreme Court de-
clared the tax unconstitutional. Two years later in Western Live-
stock v. Bureau of Revenue,58 the Court decided a similar case in
which the State of New Mexico had levied a privilege tax upon the
54. See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
358 U.S. 450 (1958) where Mr. Justice Clark remarked at 457:
The resulting judicial application of constitutional principles to
specific state statutes leaves much room for controversy and con-
fusion and little in the way of precise guides to the states in the
exercise of their indispensible power of taxation.
See also Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) where Mr. Justice Frank-
furter stated at 276: "To attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the
past would neither clarify what has gone before nor guide the future."
55. Advertising Age Magazine, Feb. 21, 1972 at 1.
56. Lee Enterprises, Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 162 N.W.2d 730,
743-44 (Iowa 1968).
57. 297 U.S. 650 (1936).
58. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
gross receipts of specified businesses. Included therein was a tax
of two per cent on amounts received from the sale of advertising
space by one engaged in the business of publishing newspapers or
magazines. The tax was sustained. Conflicting lines of authority
have evolved from these cases and require, therefore, a careful ex-
amination.
In Fischer's Blend, the Court reasoned that radio broadcasting
was an inherently interstate activity which "transcends state lines
and is national in its scope and importance."5 9 Furthermore, since
advertising was transmitted in similar fashion, and the station's
"entire income" consisted of "payments to it by other ... adver-
tisers for broadcasting," the radio station's income was "derived
from interstate commerce." 0 The Court concluded therefrom, that
the tax assessed against the radio station's gross income was one
which had "long been held to be an unconstitutional burden on in-
terstate commerce."'61 The Court then went on to make the dis-
tinction that, "whether the state could tax . . . local activity ...
as distinguished from the gross income derived from its business,
[it] was unnecessary to decide. 062 In effect, then, the Court found
the tax to be a direct burden on the unapportioned proceeds from
interstate commerce, and therefore unconstitutional.
In Western Livestock, the tax was characterized as one on
"local activities," that is, on the intrastate "business of publishing
newspapers or magazines. '6 3 Nevertheless, it was argued by the
publisher of the magazine in question that the tax was invalid be-
cause it was levied on "gross receipts which [were] to some extent
augmented by . . . an interstate circulation of the magazine.
'0 4
The analogy was thus drawn between the interstate radio trans-
mission in Fischer's Blend and the interstate circulation of a maga-
zine. The Court responded to this analogy in two ways.
First, the Court explained that the present tax was similar to
a property tax in that, "the business of preparing, printing and
publishing . . . is particularly local and distinct from its circulation
whether or not its circulation be interstate commerce. ' 65 The
Court stated:
The tax is not invalid because the value is enhanced by in-
terstate [circulation] any more than property taxes on
railroad are invalid because property value is increased by
the circumstances that the railroads do an interstate busi-
ness.66
Thus, the Court labeled the tax an indirect tax on interstate com-
59. 297 U.S. 650, 655 (1936).
60. Id. at 652.
61. Id. at 655.
62. Id.
63. 303 U.S. 250, 252 (1938).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 258.
66. Id. at 259.
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merce, sufficiently separated to create no undue burden on inter-
state commerce. Second, the Court stated that the danger that
taxes levied by reference to the gross receipts of concerns involved
in interstate commerce is that they may place on that commerce
"burdens of such a nature as to be capable . . . of being imposed
with equal right by every state which the commerce touches.
'6 7
In the Western Livestock case, the Court saw no danger of this pos-
sibility since the tax was not one "which in form or substance can
be repeated by other states in such manner as to lay an added bur-
den on the interstate distribution of the magazine."68  In other
words, the tax did not violate the multiple burden text because no
other state could duplicate the tax in question. Unquestionably,
the Court is correct in assuming that no other state may impose a
tax on the privilege of maintaining a publishing business in the
State of New Mexico; however, that statement recognizes only one
side of the tax coin. In taxation, as with most things, the name
ascribed to an item is not so important as its nature. Thus, while
a tax may be levied on a particular "activity," this is a far different
consideration from the method by which it is assessed.
The Western Livestock tax was collected on gross receipts from
advertising. Presumably those gross receipts included monies
from out-of-state advertisers as well as instate advertisers. There-
fore, the tax may have been on instate activities, but it was par-
tially assessed against the proceeds from interstate sales. Thus, it
is not unreasonable to argue that the tax directly affected inter-
state commerce. However, since the tax was sustained, it must be
concluded that the Court determined that the burden on interstate
commerce was significant.
The alternative method (discussed above) for sustaining gross
receipts taxes which include receipts from interstate commerce is
to apportion them to tax only intrastate sales.6 9 In Western Live-
stock, the Court noted that while there was no definite apportion-
ment, the tax affected only advertising revenue and did not in-
clude receipts from subscription revenue. 70 Then the Court stated
in a fashion which appears to presage General Motors v. Washing-
ton:
Selling price (of advertising), taken as a measure of values
is for all practical purposes a convenient means of ar-
riving at an equitable measure of the burden which may
be imposed on an admittedly taxable subject matter.71
67. Id. at 255.
68. Id. at 260.
69. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
70. 303 U.S. 250, 256 (1938).
71. Id. at 258.
In sum, then, the Court sustained the tax on two theories: (1)
that it was an indirect burden on local activities; (2) that it was,
to some extent at least, apportioned; and in either case the possi-
bility of multiple taxation was excluded.
Since Western Livestock, there have been no Supreme Court
decisions on this particular point involving state taxation of ad-
vertising. Consequently, all attempts to interpret Fischer's Blend
and Western Livestock, and to extract their implications have come
from decisions in lower federal courts and more particularly from
state courts. It is upon the validity of these decisions that the con-
stitutionality of a tax on advertising will depend.
B. Interpretations of Fischer's Blend and Western Livestock
The New Mexico legislature, fresh from its victory in Western
Livestock, moved next to tax the gross receipts from the business
of persons engaged in radio broadcasting. The tax was challenged
by radio station KOB, Albuquerque, which transmitted radio pro-
grams to sixteen states as well as to the Republic of Mexico and
the Dominion of Canada. 72 The Supreme Court of New Mexico
found that the tax was a direct burden on interstate commerce,
similar to the tax in Fischer's Blend, and therefore was invalid;
but the court held the tax invalid only to the extent that the gross
receipts of the radio station encompassed revenue from interstate
commerce, Thus, the court concluded that the tax was constitu-
tional to the extent it was imposed upon "local advertising by radio
for local business. '7 3 The court cited two reasons for this latter
conclusion: (1) that local advertising is intrastate business, and
(2) that advertising of local business is a "taxable event" open to
the states.74 Both contentions are well recognized; the first be-
speaks the apportionment principle and the second is based on the
premise that state taxation of local activities only indirectly affects
interstate commerce, both commonly acceptable rationales for state
taxation of interstate commerce.
The importance of the Albuquerque decision, however, lies in
the court's first conclusion: that a gross receipts tax on advertis-
ing engaged in interstate commerce is unconstitutional. In this re-
spect the New Mexico court felt bound by the then recent United
States Supreme Court decision in Freeman v. Hewit.7 5 In the
Hewit opinion the New Mexico court saw "indications" that the Su-
preme Court had become "worried over the fate of the commerce
clause, which had been nibbled away by ingenious taxes laid by the
72. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 51 N.M. 332,
184 P.2d 416 (1947).
73. Id. at 347, 184 P.2d at 431.
74. Id. at 345, 184 P.2d at 429.
75. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
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states."76 In Hewit, the Court invalidated a gross receipts tax on
the proceeds from an interstate sale, on the theory that the tax
was a direct burden on that commerce. 77 Similarly, the New Mex-
ico court held that a gross receipts tax on radio station broadcasting
to a multistate audience is a direct tax on the proceeds from inter-
state commerce and therefore unconstitutional.
78
It was only a matter of time before New York, advertisings'
"home court," hosted an important contest in the continuing battle
between taxation of commercial advertising and the commerce
clause. In the 1957 case of New Yorker Magazine v. Gerosa,79 the
New Yorker Magazine Corporation challenged the constitutionality
of a New York City gross receipts tax levied upon the proceeds
from advertising. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the tax
notwithstanding the fact that 80 per cent of the magazine's circula-
tion was outside the taxing state.80 When compared with the Wes-
tern Livestock case, which also involved a tax on the publishing
industry, several differences make the New Yorker case note-
worthy.
Unlike the journal in Western Livestock, The New Yorker is
printed in and shipped for circulation from Ohio, outside the taxing
state. The argument was made, therefore, that there were not
sufficient local activities to support the tax in New York.8 1 The
court held, however, that the tax was not on publishing, as had
been the case in Western Livestock; rather, the New York tax was
on the sale of advertising, which the court contended was a wholly
local incident.
8 2
On a related point, it was argued in the New Yorker case that
in an earlier New York decision a similar tax had been invalidated
against McCall's Magazine, which also was published outside the
taxing state in Connecticut.8 3 The crucial difference between the
two which justifies different results, according to the court, was
that McCalls printed the magazine "at its own printing plant out-
of-state," whereas The New Yorker was printed by an independent
printer. 84 The distinction rests upon the fact that if Ohio or Con-
76. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 51 N.M. 332,
344, 184 P.2d 416, 428 (1947).
77. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
78. 51 N.M. 332, 347, 184 P.2d 416, 431 (1947).
79. 3 N.Y.2d 363, 144 N.E.2d 367 (1957).
80. Id. at 364, 144 NE.2d at 368.
81. Id. at 366, 144 N.E.2d at 370.
82. Id.
83. McCall Corp. v. Joseph,. 284 App. Div. 484, 132 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1954).
84. 3 N.Y.2d at 366, 144 N.E.2d at 370 (1957).
necticut had had statutes which taxed publishings based upon
gross receipts, McCalls would have been liable for a double tax un-
der the New York law whereas The New Yorker would not. Thus,
in order to protect McCalls from multiple-burden liability, the New
York law was held invalid.
Of further interest was the court's answer to The New Yorker's
contention that the tax illegally discriminated between magazines
and radio and television broadcasters, who compete with magazines
for advertising business but had been allowed to "allocate adver-
tising receipts on the ground that their advertising activities were
in interstate commerce." '85 As though to acknowledge the total ob-
viousness of the dichotomy the court responded, "the ready answer
is that [magazine] advertising receipts result from local activity
while radio and television broadcasting is interstate."86 It is sub-
mitted that the court's "ready" answer suffers from a logical in-
consistency. Undoubtedly, there are distinctions between the pub-
lishing and the broadcasting media; however, there appears to be
very little if any distinction in their respective receipts from the
sale of advertising. If a distinction is made, it does not follow that
advertising receipts from radio and television are interstate com-
merce whereas advertising receipts from newspapers and maga-
zines are intrastate. For example, a small radio station in the cen-
ter of New York State may never receive an advertisement from
an out-of-state advertiser, while The New Yorker undoubtedly en-
tertains advertisements from all over the United States.
Thus, The New Yorker decision, with regard to its position on
the publishing media, stands in line with the Western Livestock
tradition which holds that a state may tax the gross receipts from
advertising done in the magazine and newspaper industries as long
as the tax is on a local activity and the tax may not be duplicated
by any other state.87 Such tax survives the direct burden test
since the tax on local activities is considered an indirect burden on
interstate commerce. It also satisfies the multiple burden test since
it can be shown that the commerce would not suffer cumulative
tax burdens.
On the other hand, the decision in Albuquerque Broadcasting
Co. v. Bureau of Revenue in which New Mexico's tax on radio
broadcasting was held invalid is in harmony with the Fischer's
Blend case as well as with the dicta in New Yorker, which holds
that a gross receipts tax on proceeds from advertising in the broad-
casting industry is unconstitutional because it is a direct burden
on interstate commerce.8 8 However, Fischer's Blend implies, and
85. Id.
86. Id. at 367, 144 N.E.2d at 371.
87. See notes 83 and 84 and accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 60, 69 and 76 and accompanying text supra.
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Albuquerque holds, that an apportioned tax on intrastate sales
would be valid.89
It is submitted that the only distinction between the two lines
of cases (broadcasting and publishing) is that publishing is con-
sidered a sufficiently local activity to sustain a gross receipts tax
whereas broadcasting is seen as an inherently interstate activity.
This distinction has unquestionably evolved from the language in
Fischer's Blend, that radio broadcasting is an inherently interstate
activity. 0 This proposition was analyzed in a recent Iowa Su-
preme Court decision and found to be no longer valid.
In Lee Enterprises Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Commission, the Su-
preme Court of Iowa upheld a state statute which extended a three
per cent tax to the gross receipts from the sale of all advertising
services rendered within the state.9 1 The tax was levied upon
newspapers, magazines, radio and television alike, and was not ap-
portioned in any manner. The court first dealt with the printed
materials. Relying upon Western Livestock and New Yorker, the
court concluded that with respect to printed matter there was no
obstacle to the tax.92 The court emphasized that any increase in
revenue because of interstate circulation was too remote to call the
tax a burden on interstate commerce.9 This was the position
taken in Western Livestock and New Yorker.9 4 That the Western
Livestock tax was levied only on local activities whereas the Iowa
tax was on total sales was not, in the court's opinion, a sufficient
difference to impose an undue burden on commerce.95 The undue
burden, the court stated, depended not upon whether the circula-
tion of the newspaper in question was interstate, nor whether ad-
vertisers paid at an increased rate to reach a multistate audience,
but upon whether the tax could be repeated by other states.98
Thus, in applying the multiple burden test to newspapers and
magazines the court found the tax constitutional.9 7
The court next discussed the tax as it applied to radio and tele-
vision. Without mentioning the Albuquerque Broadcasting deci-
sion or the dicta in the New Yorker decision, the court again found
no obstacle to the tax. The court conceded that radio and televi-
89. See notes 60 and 71 and accompanying text supra.
90. 297 U.S. at 651.
91. 162 N.W.2d 730, 743 (Iowa 1968).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 740.
94. See notes 63 and 80 and accompanying text supra.
95. 162 N.W.2d 743, 746.
96. Id. at 748.
97. Id. at 749.
sion stations in Iowa were engaged in interstate activities as well as
intrastate activities 8 However, the court ignored the direct bur-
den test and applied the multiple burden test to the facts. In so
doing the court concluded that the tax was valid because no other
state could tax that advertising emanating from Iowa broadcasting
towers. 99
Nor was the Iowa court affected by the failure to apportion the
tax. In this respect the court relied heavily on the United States
Supreme Court decision in General Motors v. Washington.0 0 The
Iowa court quoted from General Motors:
The question is whether the state has exerted its power in
proper proportion to . . . activities within the state ...
We look to the taxpayer's business activities within the
state . . . to determine if the gross receipts from sales
therein may be fairly related to those activities. 101
Thus, the Iowa court concluded that total sales were "fairly re-
lated" to the activities of a radio or televison broadcasting busi-
ness in the the state of Iowa. The significant point of the case was
the singular reliance on the multiple burden test as the exclusive
test to determine the constitutionality of a tax on interstate com-
merce.
In distinguishing Fischer's Blend, the Iowa court stated that
that case had failed to look at the tax from the point of view of the
multiple burden test which "now is considered more important,"
and further, that any conflict between Fischer's Blend and Western
Livestock should be resolved in favor of the more recent deci-
sion.102.
It is submitted that the Lee decision stands for two proposi-
tions which were needed to stablize this area. First, that for the
purposes of taxation, newspapers, magazines, radio, and relevision
should be treated equally; second, that the multiple burden test
should be employed to judge all commerce clause conflicts. With
these points in mind, the proposed Pennsylvania tax will be ex-
amined.
IV. PENNSYLVANIA SALES TAX ON ADVERTISING
On July 12, 1971, H.B. 1335 was introduced to the General As-
sembly of Pennsylvania.1 03 The purpose of the bill is to amend
the Pennsylvania Sales and Use Tax Act to include "the rendition
for a consideration of the service of advertising," and "the obtain-
ing by a purchaser of this service of advertising" as taxable acti-
vities. The bill does not distinguish the publishing and broadcast-
98. Id. at 750.
99. Id. at 752.
100. 377 U.S. 436 (1964). See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
101. 162 N.W.2d 743, 752.
102. Id.
103. H.B. 1335, Sess. 1971, § 201 (Printer's No. 1537).
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ing media; therefore, it would seem to apply equally to both media.
Nor does the bill provide for apportionment between interstate
commerce and intrastate commerce. Thus, it is quite similar to
the Iowa sales tax discussion above.' 04 If passed, the bill will have
to overcome two burdens if challenged in the courts. The first is
the problem of constitutionality and the second is the apparent con-
flict which exists between the bill and existing Pennsylvania tax
legislation.
A. Constitutionality
It is submitted that there is no constitutional problem in tax-
ing the publishing media. No decision can be found which pro-
hibits such a tax; while on the other hand, the Western Livestock,
The New Yorker, and Lee Enterprises cases all sustain it. 10O' A
clear conflict exists, however, with regard to taxation of the broad-
casting media. The problem began with the Fischer's Blend case
in 1936 and has continued to date. It is submitted that the better
view is to adopt the position taken in Lee Enterprises and tax both
industries on an equal basis.' 0 6 To call one medium inherently in-
terstate and the other intrastate is to continue an erroneous fiction
which may have had some validity in the past but is clearly unap-
propriate today. Clearly either medium may encompass interstate
commerce. It is submitted therefore that the more realistic dis-
tinction is whether the tax creates the possibility of cumulative
burdens on that interstate commerce. Earlier it was noted that
there are two methods of avoiding this possibility. One is to levy
the tax in such a fashion that it cannot be duplicated in another
state, and the other is to apportion it to include solely that com-
merce within the taxing state. Since the Pennsylvania tax is not
apportioned, it must be shown that the commerce taxed would not
be open to cumulative burdens if the tax were passed. The possi-
bility of multiple taxation was discussed by the Lee Enterprises
court and it was concluded that none existed because there is no
incident which is within any other state's jurisdiction to tax. It
was theorized in Lee Enterprises that in fact newspapers and maga-
zines, which produce a tangible product had a greater likelihood of
affording another state the possibility of taxing the same com-
merce10 7 than did radio and television whose only invasion of an-
104. See notes 91-98 and accompanying text supra.
105. See notes 71, 82 and 93 and accompanying text supra.
106. See notes 91-98 and accompanying text supra.
107. 162 N.W.2d 743, 749. The court stated:
This, of course, is less taxable activity than appears by circulat-
other state's territory is in the form of a highly intangible electro-
magnetic wave frequency. In any event, the Lee Enterprises court
concluded that there was no way in which another state could tax
advertising disseminated in any form into that state. 0 8 It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that the Pennsylvania tax, as well as those like
it, is constitutional.
B. Statutory Conflicts
There are two arguments which advance the proposition that
the proposed Pennsylvania tax on advertising is incongruous with
existing Pennsylvania tax legislation. It is submitted, however,
that these contentions are unfounded. The first argument is that
the present sales tax segregates telephone and telegraph communi-
cation into intrastate and interstate services and provides for the
taxation of the intrastate service only.10 9 This distinction is in
keeping with previous United States Supreme Court decisions
which have disallowed taxation on interstate communications. 110
The reason for this is apparent: It would be as easy for the trans-
mitting state to tax the communication as it would be for the re-
ceiving state, thus subjecting the same telephone conversation or
telegraph message to two taxes or a cumulative burden. The same
opportunity is not open to the states with regard to radio, televi-
tion or magazine communications. No state has provided for the
taxation of television reception:"' Absent this fact there is no
incongruity.
The Pennsylvania Sales and Use Tax also provides that a per-
son rendering a taxable service need not collect a sales tax on his
rendition of services for a nonresident when the agreement be-
tween the parties requires the vendor to deliver the tangible per-
sonal property at a destination outside of the Commonwealth."
12
Therefore, the argument could be made that an out-of-state adver-
tiser should not be liable for the Pennsylvania tax if the advertise-
ment in its out-of-state dissemination is considered delivered to
the non-resident there. In the first place advertising is not tangi-
ble personal property, and second this position would not meet the
arguments advanced Western Livestock in that all of the taxa-
ing a newspaper in another state. It is true the radio and television
stations send out or create electrical impulses or waves, which is
the artificial method of carrying words or pictures beyond that
provided by nature, but how can this method of dissemination be
taxed in another state?
108. 162 N.W.2d 743, 749 (Iowa 1968).
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 201 (1963).
110. See, e.g., Cooney v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 294 U.S.
384 (1935).
111. The only time this was tried the tax was declared unconstitu-
tional. See Station WBT v. Poulnot, 46 F.2d 671 (E.D.S.C. 1931).
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 102 (1963).
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ble incidents of sale, publishing, and broadcasting occur in the state
of dissemination. Therefore the delivery exception should not pre-
sent any difficulty to the proposed tax on advertising.
It is submitted that the proposed amendment to the Pennsyl-
vania Sales and Use Tax is both constitutional and consistent with
current legislation and should, therefore, survive any future litiga-
tion if passed in its present form.
V. CONCLUSION
The court's attempted resolution of the conflict which exists
between the federal government and the states with regard to the
taxation of interstate commercial advertising is undramatically
chaotic. This Comment in urging the adoption of a single standard
by which to judge the multitudenous taxes does not deprecate the
obvious distinctions which can be found to justify multiple stand-
ards, but rather suggests that certainty and stability suffer to a
greater degree than the distinctions warrant. To paraphrase a re-
mark made in another context, but in similar spirit and applica-
bility, I am not so much determining a point of law, as I am restor-
ing tranquility.113
WILLIAM R. Mum, JR.
113. Edmund Burke, Speech on the Conciliation with America, Mar. 22,
1775, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, 2d Edition, 101 (1966).
